

The brave new world of local security

Dutch scenarios of police and citizenship in 2020

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1. Introduction

Until the 1960s, the police was held primary responsibility for fighting crime and social disturbances. Until that time, it had been taken for granted that citizens were the object of their actions and not a party with whom they could collaborate. Beginning in the 1980s, crime prevention was recognised as another central task of the police. Since that decade, a process of socialisation emerged within the police system, with community policing playing a major role. The management of criminality required a broader social embeddedness, including the reinforcement of functional surveillance so that even minor infractions and nuisances could be addressed effectively. ‘Neighbourhood prevention projects’, which were carried by citizens, were also initiated in the 1980s. Many measures (e.g. closing off porches, and the introduction of house managers and local safety guards) were part of social innovation policies. Since then, the complexity of society has advanced so far that supervision and control are now organised within an integral security policy; the police are but one of the partners in this new constellation.

Current local security policies are actually being driven farther away from the classic model of criminal law enforcement. In the classic model, the government intervenes after the incident, based on exclusive responsibility, through fines and other sanctions (or the threat of sanctions). Current security policies focus much more strongly on anticipating, controlling and preventing problems that are threatening to occur.

Future interactions between the police and citizens will take many different forms. Citizens may prefer a passive role, acting as consumers. In other cases, they may take the initiative to address local security problems on their own. One important factor is the amount of space that future developments allow for citizen participation. For example, assume that reactions to crime continue to become ‘harder’ or that the role of techno-prevention and information management in arranging security becomes stronger. What will be left for citizens to contribute? Which trends will have an impact on the relationship between citizens and the police? Will the prevention logic assume an even more dominant role, or will the importance of legal guarantees remain undiminished? In what way can and should the police realise co-production with other institutions and with citizens? How do citizens perceive the police? What do they expect of the police?

In this study, a number of future scenarios are developed in order to address these questions within a layered framework. The purpose of this study is not to develop predictions for the future – it is obviously impossible to make any reliable statements about the future. The scenarios that are constructed do offer insight into various future social contexts within which police and citizenship may or may not be able to thrive.

¹ This contribution has been prepared in a ‘brainstormgroup’ discussing the characteristics of the scenario’s mentioned below. The authors would like to thank the following members of this group for their contribution: Auke van Dijk, Marnix Eysink Smeets, Pieter Tops, Niels Uitdriks and Stavros Zouridis,

To construct the scenarios, we follow the approach and methods specified in *Justitie over morgen* (Tomorrow's justice): building on scenarios in high-pressure contexts and surroundings. First, we identify the core uncertainties in these social contexts. This step involves a number of dominant and complex developments, the course of which is difficult to predict. We cannot say in which direction they will exactly proceed. These 'unpredictable' developments also have major consequences for the police. In order to make this complexity manageable, it is beneficial to start by gaining insight into the most important sources of uncertainty. The impact of these sources of uncertainty is high, and their development is difficult to influence. Second, we develop four scenarios that incorporate several dimensions of those core uncertainties. Each scenario outlines a plausible image of the social environment in which interactions between police and citizens will take place in 2020. Finally, we determine which policy strategies can be developed. Opportunities and threats are associated with each of the scenarios, and they call for varying policy reactions. The scope of this study allows only summary and highly tentative answers to this question.

Thus, the present discussion of security is taken away from the everyday mindset of the police organisation, including such well-known aspirations as 'focusing on core tasks', 'restoring authority' and 'reducing crime'. This allows us to break through obvious conclusions (e.g. 'the growth of insecurity in entertainment areas will require additional police'). In this way, we aim to explore the developments that will confront the police, to consider the implications of these developments and to determine how police policies can or should act upon these developments. The time horizon is limited to the next ten years. This range is not too far in the future (which would say little of importance, as everything would be open to discussion), and it is not too close (looking beyond the next cabinet terms).

2. Relevant social and cultural developments

This section provides a more detailed discussion of several dominant social developments that are likely to shape future uncertainties. The discussion involves urgent developments, the course of which is relatively unpredictable and which are likely to affect future police policy. We can distinguish at least three of these developments. The first involves the rise of a 'risk society', in which insecurity is increasingly answered through risk assessment and risk management. The second development involves a potential crisis of legitimacy in which the state is in danger of becoming mired. This crisis of legitimacy has consequences for the police as well, in part because many citizens cherish high expectations and because policy focuses largely on output legitimacy. The third development is related to juvenile delinquency and anti-social behaviour, the weakening of public morality (or the perception thereof) and the subsequent hardening of security policies.

It is important to stress that the implications of these developments are highly ambivalent. On the one hand, they are related to real problems and worries of the public. On the other hand, they are related to the ways in which officials and professionals actually react. The extent to which these policy reactions may offer adequate solutions is not always clear. Such reactions might be part of the problem. The identification of potentially counter-productive interventions should be an integral aspect of professionalism, and it is one of the functions of this scenario study.

2.1. Risk society

The increasing number of risks (e.g. through greater traffic intensity, genetic production, etc.) is forcing policymakers and politicians to engage in risk management. Thinking in terms of risk has become more or less unavoidable. Regardless (or perhaps even because) of the growth of knowledge about possible risks (e.g. with regard to illness, traffic, crime, etc.), the uncertainty about and fear of insecurity has increased as well. Giddens (1991) describes this development in paradoxical terms: never have there been so much time, attention and expertise devoted to fighting risks, but at the same time trust in expertise has become uncertain.

In our view, the most dominant tendencies can be described as follows. First, many new risks have arisen today that did not exist several decades ago. These risks are related to individualism, flexible labour relations, increased mobility and other macro-sociological tendencies. Society has reached larger-scale proportions, and social relations have become more diverse and intense; safe and stable communities do not seem to exist anymore.

This has generated a need for new tests of trustworthiness. Citizens and businesses are classified and scanned by coupling large-scale data and information files. The increased intensity of the fight against international terrorism since 2001 has given powerful reinforcement to this tendency. Current security policies also appear to involve an increasing element of medical control (e.g. genetic screening, AIDS control). The biological dimension of life is becoming more and more important.

Not only new risks came into being, but also existing risks are more and more mapped. This has also led to the systematic prediction of behaviour and the classification of people according to the risks that they reflect (i.e. risk assessment and risk management) (Ericson and Haggerty 1997; Harcourt 2007). Crime control and prevention networks have become responsible for identifying and managing risks. The new technologies involve systematic identification of target groups. Police have become 'knowledge workers' in the field of risk communication, and intersect with other major institutions including the insurance and security industries. This trend no longer serves the ends of criminal justice. According to Ericson and Haggerty, 'Policing consists of the public police co-ordinating their activities with policing agents in all other institutions to provide a society-wide basis for risk management (governance) and security (guarantees against loss)' (Ericson and Haggerty 1997, p. 3).

Risk professionals

Professionals have a dominant role in modern society, not only in terms of offering resources for solving problems, but with regard to defining problems as well. Professionals may cause and even exacerbate certain problems, including security problems. From this perspective, the risk society is accompanied by the following developments. First, a visible change is emerging within the professional regimes. Security is becoming less and less defined in terms of crime and legal violations. It is taken for granted that all kinds of security risks should be managed appropriately.

Many signs are suggesting that the problem of criminality is increasingly becoming a matter of administrative order instead of a judicial/legal problem (i.e. the discourse is shifting from 'guilt and punishment' to 'risk, prevention and accountability'). According to Boutellier (2002), integral security is giving criminality the same impersonal character as other risks. In the future, policing is likely to become a moral technology; proactive approaches to policing will continue to

include strategies that appear to be contrary to the norms of criminal justice. Many problems that are addressed (e.g. loitering, truancy, alcohol use) have no obvious connection to crime.

In this respect, Feeley and Simon (1994) developed the notion of 'actuarial justice'. The old penology was marked by concern for individuals, and preoccupied with such concepts as guilt, responsibility and obligation, and rehabilitation of an individual offender. The new penology, however, is 'concerned with techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups assorted by levels of dangerousness. It takes crime for granted. It accepts deviance as normal.' (Feeley and Simon 1994: p. 173).

Actuarial justice shifts attention towards the management of future behaviour by identifying people who are likely to cause problems (risk prediction) and people with a reputation for risk based on previous crime or damages (the identification of 'bad risks'). Perceived suspects are assigned to 'risk categories'; characteristics of groups and behaviours are becoming criminalised (e.g. people are barred from shopping malls according to particular behaviours or clothing). Individuals are not so much approached as responsible people but as 'dangers'. The following are among the measures and behavioural programmes that have been imposed:

- Mandatory assistance / support (training and education, addiction counselling, institutional admission, etc.)
- Exclusion (obliged registration / house arrest)
- Incarceration (selective incapacitation of recidivists / suspected terrorists)

Not only has a new regime emerged, but new players have also entered the stage. We are far from facing the old constellation, in which security was a matter for the national government. The burden of managing risk has shifted away from the government and towards private organisations and agencies (Braithwaite 2000; Crawford 2006). Security is big business, and it is in the hands of security organisations that have private clients. Private parties are establishing their own security programmes. Governance has thus moved away from state sovereignty and control in the direction of power networks. The state is only one of many nodes in networks of regulation. Public police form one node within these networks; other nodes include private security guards, insurance companies, regulatory agencies, business and shop owners and schools (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Mazerolle and Ransley 2006; Boutellier 2007).

Nonetheless, these nodes for crime control are not created in a vacuum; they are often the result of centralised state policymaking. Such high-order, complex crime problems as child sexual assault tend to stir up newspaper headlines and challenge the state to create wide-ranging policies to guide intervention. Crime-control partnerships (e.g. with doctors, police, educators, child-safety officers, etc.) for these kinds of problems are usually initiated at the administrative level, and not by the police. The police are only one partner in the process.

Interagency task forces and intervention teams all utilise technologies for crime-control purposes. Traditional police are being forced to adopt new regulatory practices and forms of risk management. Such 'third-party policing' is characterised by a fight against all kinds of criminogenic situations and places. It tends to stress efforts to control low-level street crimes. Other regulatory officials are involved as well, including building, health and safety inspectors and environmental protection officers. Such officials are attractive to the police, as their functions are often accompanied by coercive powers to enter properties, inspect and search, issue closure orders, or take other retaliatory actions (Mazerolle and Ransley 2006).

Third, improving local security demands new instruments. Although the imposition of sanctions is still used, a broad range of new instruments is being deployed as well. The police are enlarging their repertoire of interventions, and local administrations are searching for new ways to address safety problems.

The common legal basis of interventionist policing includes local statutes, ordinances, health and safety codes and laws aimed at abating drug nuisance. For the police, it is fruitful to gain the cooperation of third parties and to coerce them into helping them control the behaviour of particular targets. Civil sanctions and remedies (e.g. fines, property forfeiture, forced sales, eviction, temporary closure, restrictions on opening hours) are also utilised to solve problems. Civil remedies are proactive and strongly oriented towards damages – forcing parties to cease or accept responsibility for harmful behaviours.

In major cities, people who exhibit deviant behaviour are the ultimate targets of risk-management efforts. Such efforts are particularly directed towards street-level offenders, including young people, gang members, drug dealers, vandals, petty criminals and panhandlers. Major cities currently incorporate an increasing number of protected environments (e.g. gated communities, shopping malls), from which potentially dangerous groups and people are excluded. Financial districts, cultural zones and senior-citizen communities are isolated from the outside world that surrounds them, and they are sometimes protected by paramilitary means (Davis 1998; Schuilenburg 2008). One consequence of such spatial segregation is that districts and population groups are becoming increasingly separated from one another.

2.2. Pressures on the legitimacy of the state

Globalisation, European cooperation and many other factors have changed the position of the national government. Market regulation, privatisation and contracting are being introduced with the goal of eliminating ‘ballast’ from the overburdened government. Tasks and responsibilities are being turned over, either in whole or in part, to other parties and organisations.

Private security

The entire public sector is now experiencing a shift towards principles of organisation that are derived from the world of business. Since the mid-1980s, this new language has become dominant, and this has had many repercussions for service delivery within the traditional welfare state. Services have become products; citizens have become clients, and security has henceforth come to be viewed as a market. Management and its values – efficiency and expediency – have become dominant.

Business concepts have also been gaining strength within the police and justice systems. The police are expected to become more accountable for the performance they deliver. According to the theory of New Public Management, the police should turn away from their fixation on rules, hierarchy and bureaucracy; they should introduce more market regulation in order to become a flexible, alert and enterprising organisation. The old police system is characterized as rigid, rule-bound, closed, ineffective and financially wasteful, and the needs of citizens played no role. Thus the police are driven by business concepts and operate according to the rules of output legitimacy. Police officers have started to focus on activities that result in

measurable performance. This shift of means and ends is often accompanied by a neglect of prevention and contact with neighbourhood residents and/or co-production partners, because it is believed that these activities cannot be subjected to performance indicators (Terpstra and Trommel 2006).

In addition to the new view of management, other factors have brought about change the local security domain in Dutch cities. Budgetary cuts have played a role, as have privatisation, outsourcing and job reductions.

A process of increasingly wide-scale privatisation has been taking place with regard to the police function (Newburn 2001). In the Netherlands, the number of private security agents has attained nearly the same scale as that of the public police. Private security has also acquired a major surveillance task in such public (or semi-public) spaces as large-scale events, large industrial areas, shopping centres or even just on the street. This development responds to the increased demand for security services that the government can no longer provide through the police (Terpstra 2004). The government has lost its monopoly (whether existing or assumed) on security policy.

Responsible citizens

The tendency to give citizens a more responsible role in local security has also increased. Even aside from such motives as budgetary cutbacks and management, there have been good reasons for promoting responsibility. Citizens have a large reservoir of information at their disposal, from which the police may profit. Moreover, assigning more responsibility to citizens may enhance active citizenship.

It has become necessary for local governments to place citizen participation at the forefront of their efforts to address problems of insecurity. Co-production and the formation of networks are mandated. Citizens must learn to solve their own problems when the government steps back. Citizens are expected to become less dependent on the government and to gain a grip on their own living environments. The receding government seeks to assign responsibility to citizens and to manage from a distance by facilitating and creating rules and frameworks that allow citizens and organisations to take responsibility.

The question remains whether citizens are willing or able to accept the responsibility that is being imposed upon them. Citizenship cannot be taken for granted in an urban context (Terpstra and Kouwenhoven 2004; Garland 2001). Citizens operate primarily as workers and consumers. It is difficult to overcome the distrust that many residents have in state institutions in order to make co-production work, particularly in disadvantaged areas.

The discourse of active citizenship comprises a number of paradoxes that are associated with receding government and other factors (Roché 2002):

- The call to reinforce active citizenship is accompanied by policy that encourages flexibility on the labour market (i.e. subordinating the citizen to a working life).
- Still many citizens need professionals who can provide assistance and support, but many services are being cut from governmental budgets, and citizens are being expected to 'do it themselves'.
- Those in the most precarious situations (e.g. the long-term unemployed) are expected to mobilise themselves; they are being assigned a role that they cannot fulfil.

- Affluent groups and entrepreneurs are particularly likely to fight persistent disorder by purchasing private security services.

High expectations

The preceding notes show that society is not as malleable and manageable as is sometimes imagined. On the contrary, it is not uncommon for citizens and other actors to react in ways other than those expected by policymakers. This occurs in the field of local security as well. Nevertheless, many citizens continue to trust the national government in general, and the police in particular.

Generally citizens do not perceive insecurity as a problem within their own surroundings. Insecurity is a problem that occurs primarily 'elsewhere'. This generates a variety of demands on the state, particularly the police. People demand moral support in their own surroundings and a repressive approach elsewhere.

In 2003, 69% of the population reported trusting the police (EU average 67%, see Van der Vijver 2006: p. 81).² Satisfaction with police functioning has also remained steady over the past two decades. In contrast, opinions regarding police methods have become more critical. This cannot be explained by decreased performance (among other reasons, because decreases in criminality have not translated into greater satisfaction; see also Innes and Fielding 2002). Public attention to insecurity (which is usually negative) apparently plays a major role. In addition, such judgments seem primarily dependent on expectations regarding the reduction of potential threats and uncertainties (which are usually high). It is becoming increasingly difficult to meet these expectations. According to Van der Vijver, such reassuring elements as predictability and certainty are likely to become more important in the future.

Regardless of the assumed bankruptcy of the 'manageability mentality', citizens continue to place extremely heavy demands on the government and social institutions. The number of people who think that 'something should be done' about acute problems continues to increase. According to Elchardus (2002), this development is an expression of a broader pursuit to increase certainty and reduce anxiety that is consistent with a populist climate based on political vigour and high consumer expectations.

Nevertheless, the political realm reacts immediately when trust is at issue. In times of social and ethnic tensions, therefore, the Dutch government proceeds to augment its ambitions – the neo-liberal prescription to remain aloof notwithstanding.

In this climate, the government is trying, at times quite stubbornly, to convince both itself and its citizens of its strength. For example, in 2002, the government promised that the Netherlands would be between 20% and 25% safer within five years (memorandum entitled *Naar een veiliger samenleving* [Towards a safer society]). Local policies also frequently contain resolutions to reduce crime by a large percentage, while also increasing the feelings of security. In contrast, there appears to be continuing uncertainty regarding the choice of strategies and programmes. In short, the government curiously combines retreating and

² See also Intomart (2006): trust in the police – understood as the expectation and the belief that the police will perform cooperatively and reciprocally and that, in precarious situations, they will be there and do everything they can to help – has remained stable in recent years.

intervening strategies. On the one hand, unnecessary legislation and bureaucratic excess should be eliminated. On the other hand, more governmental intervention is desired (Boutellier 2005).

A third point, however, is that these political ambitions can be substantiated only in part. They are likely to bring along new problems, given the tendency of citizen expectations to increase as well. This may feed feelings of disappointment and the idea that the government does not really want to promote security.

Many tensions and frictions are arising between the expectations of citizens and the actions of the state. Citizens expect the state to focus primarily on providing solutions – if not guarantees – for security problems. For example, a growing number of citizens would like the state to take harsher and more repressive action, at least as long as others (e.g. marginalised citizens and newcomers) are involved. But at the same time they tend to favour an alternative approach for cases involving nuisance and crime by people ‘from their own circles’ (e.g. young people from the community). In such cases, the police should be available and accessible, and they should offer solutions in consultation with those who are involved (Van der Vijver 2006). In other words, violators with whom we cannot identify should be dealt with harshly, but we lay claim to remain free of interventions, even if our behaviour imposes costs on others. In such instances, we tend to resent state paternalism (see also Boutellier 2002).

Thinking in terms of manageability and the formulation of ambitious goals raises expectations, and it can therefore contribute to the impression that the government is failing. Assertive citizens place high demands on the state, and they are less likely to accept situations in which the state does not succeed in meeting these demands (Van der Vijver 2006). Customer orientation encourages citizens to adopt a passive attitude, while extending the functioning of the state to that of a supplier. This role is inevitably accompanied by the chance of customer dissatisfaction, questions regarding the value of the state and the confirmation of citizens in the attitude that they are not personally responsible. Such discontent can become strongly politicised within a populist political climate; citizens are approached primarily as potential victims. They have a more urgent need for constant reassurance that everything in their own surroundings is secure, calm, predictable and manageable.

2.3. Weakened public morality and harsher security policies

Social activities are being increasingly separated from their local contexts (Giddens 1991: ‘disembedding’), whereby traditions are losing their strength. A post-traditional order has emerged. Social cohesion at the community level has decreased sharply (i.e. there is less cohesion by geographic entity), although ‘weak’ social ties have grown.

At the same time, there is a tendency to restore forms of social control, albeit chiefly instigated by state agencies. In addition, we are currently witnessing ambivalent developments.

Public morality eroded?

One of the characteristics of modern society is its increasing mobility. This mobility involves important advantages, including the freedom to choose, move and innovate. The same development also involves disadvantages, however, especially when security is at stake.

Three tendencies may illustrate this. First, increased freedom does imply an important appeal to self-control. In many respects, old forms of social control and compliance with rules seem to be inadequate.

These processes of cultural fragmentation and individualisation have caused legal norms and rules to lose their clarity and authority in many areas. Many norms (e.g. adventure as opposed to safety; self-determination as opposed to following the rules) are being experienced as contradictory. This development is placing increasing demands on the self-control and normative awareness of citizens, although it is unclear whether sufficient awareness exists and whether such a sense of responsibility can coexist with the attitudes of 'calculating citizens', which are being encouraged at the same time. In addition, the increased mobility and disembedding of social life have caused informal types of social control and surveillance either to disappear or to lose at least a part of their strength (Jones and Newburn 2002).

Social control aside, modern ways of life involve an increased chance of social conflict. Citizens have developed an assertive lifestyle, which is characterised by high expectations, making claims, along with strong individual preferences (Van den Brink 2001). In this regard, Van den Brink writes, people are more quickly offended; their capacity for accommodation appears to have diminished. They are more sensitive to the violation of their personal integrity. People urge others to show more respect; the balance between the respect that is given and that which is received is monitored much more closely. For these reasons, nuisance and obtrusive behaviour are currently more likely to be perceived as troublesome than they were roughly forty years ago.

There are numerous signs that citizens, in the role of consumer or vehicle operator, have little moral firmness, and that they are only marginally oriented towards public interests. The norm is that individual choices should be respected, as long as they do not cause a nuisance to others. This suggests that visible damage has become the most important moral standard. When the injured party is not visible (e.g. fare dodging, tax fraud), violations seem to elicit little indignation.

Third, these two tendencies (assertive behaviour in combination with less social control) may lead to a downward spiral, in which anti-social behaviour spreads further and further. In its 2003 report *Waarden, normen en de last van het gedrag* (Values, norms and the burden of behaviour), the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) assessed the emergence of a negative spiral of increasing violations and decreasing normative awareness. It has become less self-evident for citizens to endorse the prevailing norms and to be corrected by their fellow citizens. These violations, however, are largely concentrated within a relatively small group of male adolescents and young adults.

While the figures for burglary and theft have declined considerably, serious and persistent sources of nuisance (e.g. public drunkenness, vandalism) continue to cause public concern. Such situations undermine the sense of security, not because of the severity of each type of incident, but because of the major consequences of the aggregated whole. They allow the idea to take root that the street is a 'no-man's land' and that the community itself has been eroded (Roché 2002). Disadvantaged communities are particularly struggling with a great deal of nuisance and disorder, while the residents often feel powerless. They wrestle with such far-reaching problems as intimidation, neglected streets, truancy, store closings and damaged trust in the municipal administration.

'Getting tough' on crime and anti-social behaviour

In the long run, assertive behaviour evokes reactions from the state. Local administrations are increasingly striving to restrain crime and anti-social behaviour and to stimulate citizenship and social cohesion in neighbourhoods. The emergence of state-focussed countertendencies can be illustrated with the following measures.

The state has proclaimed the fight to the 'decay of moral values', and is stressing social control, discipline and stricter enforcement. The range of interventions in neighbourhoods and families has been greatly expanded, and a new 'politics of behaviour' is taking hold, in which state-professionals meddle in health, education and raising children (Crawford 2006). In the Netherlands, there is considerable political pressure to introduce strategies and measures as the English anti-social behaviour orders (Van Stokkom 2008).

As in England, local security policies in the Netherlands have become much harsher in recent years. In the late 1990s, increasing criticism emerged concerning the practice of 'tolerating' lax forms of enforcement. The rules should henceforth be enforced more consistently, and violators should be dealt with immediately. It was also established that the clearing up rates were seriously deficient. This was one of the reasons for the increased demand for performance contracts. The 2002 memorandum *Naar een veiliger samenleving* (Towards a safer society) states clearly that stronger action on the part of the police is desired in order to overcome the 'codes of tolerance that have been maintained for too long with regard to criminal and nuisance-causing behaviour in public and semi-public spaces' (p. 5). Since that time, the fight against criminality and nuisance has been placed high on the political agenda.

These efforts to restrain anti-social behaviour are not always successful. For this reason, local administrators attempt to tackle the most serious problems and to 'reclaim the streets'. In the field of local security policies, new priorities are taking shape, as the case of Rotterdam makes clear.

In Rotterdam and many other cities attention is directed towards the most threatening areas (hotspots) and communities; great efforts are made to address multiple offenders, drug addicts, drug dealers and violence. In many cities, camera surveillance spread rapidly around such locations as stations and cultural and recreational areas. Municipalities have also taken many measures to limit opportunity, varying from restricting alcohol use, admission surveillance and the introduction of codes of conduct. In addition, many municipalities have adopted forms of zero tolerance policing: issuing citations for minor offences (e.g. cycling on the sidewalk, not keeping a dog on a leash or drinking beer in parks), particularly within the framework of the General Municipal Ordinances. In many cities, the police have assumed the task of addressing minor irritations in the public space, although this work is increasingly being performed by a new group of municipal guards. Homeless people, drug addicts and buskers are dealt with harshly.

The policy in Rotterdam is illustrative of the tendency to place the fight against insecurity under administrative direction (Tops 2006). Police, municipal services and social organisations are expected to work towards a structural approach to insecurity and to establish it in the form of multi-year plans. Intensive cooperation is expected among the police, criminal justice system, housing corporations, social work, education and youth work, also through management by outputs according to targets.

Various rigorous strategies (e.g. preventive searching, fighting illegal room rentals, crack houses and cannabis cultivation) have been developed to restore security in Rotterdam. The military metaphors of city marines, hotspot areas and intervention teams makes it clear that certain social spaces must be ‘recaptured’ (Engbersen et al. 2005). Many cities in the Netherlands have begun the fight against problematic groups of young people. Many have adopted a ‘person-oriented approach’, which involves drug addicts, multiple offenders, illegal immigrants and young troublemakers. Such offenders are faced with the choice of following a rehabilitation programme or receive a criminal sentence.

3. Two core uncertainties and four security scenarios

How can the developments that have been outlined be interpreted in light of future security policies? It is unclear how these patterns will manifest themselves. Will the actuarial logic continue across the board, or will people hold on to freedom and legal guarantees? Will feelings of anxiety continue to gain strength, despite receding criminality? Recent data from the Social and Cultural Planning Office of the Netherlands (SCP 2006) suggest that anxiety and uncertainty are retreating rapidly as well. More than 82% of the Dutch population report feeling ‘happy’ or even ‘very happy’. This provides sufficient cause for caution in extrapolating from the trends that are described above.

What should we think of the (assumed) decrease in legitimacy? Is trust in the government – particularly in the public police – breaking down as seriously as often is claimed? A mediocracy that persistently reports scandals creates the impression that the strength of the government is seriously restricted. At the same time, the government is taking the lead in regulating nuisance and anti-social behaviour. Are we dealing with a state that is in retreat, offering more scope to private initiatives? Or is a new ‘interventionist state’ progressing rapidly? At any rate, there is a diverging range of expectations with regard to the government.

With regard to the self-image of citizens, we could ask whether they are more self-interested or whether the heightened sensitivity has caused them to become more moralistic. Are they inclined to ‘consume’ security and likely to cloister themselves behind the walls of gated communities, or are safe and lively public urban domains the way of the future? Will risk-technologies prevail, or will new forms of moral regulation reappear?

3.1. Two core uncertainties

The discussion above suggests two uncertainties. The first involves the actors that are to bear responsibility for security, and the second involves the resources they are to use for this purpose.


With regard to the first question, two extreme situations can be contrasted. In one conceivable situation, the national state is the only legitimate actor. This situation implies that the state’s monopoly on the use of force is strictly enforced and even extended. To this end, governments acquire new authorities, and the rights of citizens are conceived less indisputable. Any attempt at self-regulation is likely to meet with opposition from the state, and the involvement of citizens with security policies is severely restricted. The promotion of security becomes an increasingly professional task involving the police and other specialised services, including the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), the armed forces and counter-terrorism

units. Although these agencies operate on behalf of the state, they allow little democratic control or involvement.

In a contrasting situation, security is primarily a matter for citizens and other private parties. Aside from maintaining a few basic facilities, the state’s role ends with determining the legal framework. Private actors are largely empowered and expected to do the rest on their own. One way to accomplish this would be for residents to assume a number of policing duties, involving detective work, in addition to surveillance. Another possibility in this situation would be for businesses to invest considerable resources in security and protection. This situation also implies the emergence of a wide array of private security services to fulfil a large share of the tasks that are currently performed by the police.

Neither of these situations is likely to be realised within the foreseeable future. For many reasons, allowing security to be the sole responsibility of either the national state or private actors is a highly risky prospect. The most likely situation is a certain mixed relationship, in which the two poles alternate in dominance. The relative shares to be held by the state and by citizens are surrounded by considerable uncertainty, as is the exact point at which the balance is to be found.

Another question involves the resources that are to play a major role in security. Two extreme situations can be contrasted in this regard as well. One conceivable situation revolves primarily around the use of new technology. The police (and other actors) use new instruments in order to identify security risks early. In addition to cameras and digital tools, this situation would involve considerable use of ‘automatic responses’ in the methods of enforcement (e.g. behaviour A automatically initiates reaction B). Moral and normative considerations play no significant role in this context.



The exact opposite holds for the other situation, in which the primary emphasis is on the use of moral, social, educational or normative resources, with minimal dependence on technology. This situation implies that security is largely ‘people work’; personal relations are highly important, social control is able to operate, and the decisive role is ultimately played by the conscience of citizens and professionals. As was the case with the first two situations, the

complete realisation of either of these situations is unlikely. The extent to which future developments will move in one direction or the other, however, is unclear.

The combination of these two dimensions leads to the four possible scenarios represented in the following figure. The vertical axis represents the most prominent actors in managing security (with the two extremes being the citizens and the state). The horizontal axis represents the resources that are to be used (with the extremes being morality and technology).

3.2. Four scenarios

The two core uncertainties can be used to construct four scenarios of public security policies. Interaction between police and citizens takes an entirely different form in each of these scenarios. The scenarios represent future situations that could actually happen and that form a real possibility. They are in no way utopian constructions. Each scenario is characterised by unique ordering principles and the associated core values and perspectives on the ‘collective good’ of the police and local security policies. These principles are based on the sequence market (exit), civil society (voice) and state (loyalty) (see Hirschman 1970), although the exit mechanism of the market is split up in two separate principles: exchange and avoidance (for this last term, see Black 1998). Each scenario also involves unique types of problems that could place the public police function under pressure.

In the sections that follow, the most important situational factors (i.e. the social climate) of each scenario are identified, as well as how the relationship between the police and citizens is shaped and the problems that accompany the public policing task. The purpose of these sections is to outline the direction of developments and to reflect the ultimate consequences for local security management, in order to reveal the problems and dilemmas that arise within the scenarios.

A. Market regulation

Within this scenario, the market serves as the ordering mechanism. Relationships are structured through exchange. There is trust in economic prosperity and a belief in the future, as long as the government remains at a distance. Individuals are responsible for themselves. Security is for sale. Private security is the most obvious choice. Citizens being dependent upon the government, however, wish to have tangible results for how their tax money is being spent. ‘Value for money’ is the watchword. Public police is ‘minimal’ and its policy is also characterised by a demand-driven character, and it is held accountable according to output (performance). The police must therefore compete for the favour of consumers. It is believed that in these ways the cost of police services could be reduced considerably. Marketing, customer satisfaction surveys and polls to determine the desires of the majority of the population bear major influence.

Citizens are difficult to activate for the public good, and they refuse to let the government tell them what to do. They are quick to ‘blame’ professionals. General practitioners who fail to act quickly or teachers who ignore students are quite likely to be sued. Citizen consumers are suspicious of service workers and are quick to charge them with obstruction.

People have been made individually responsible. Accountability is thus not considered a shared concern. Prudent individuals obtain insurance, identify and minimise risk, and manage their own security. Those who are alert are rewarded with bonuses in their health insurance, and reckless individuals are penalised.

Citizens are self-aware, assertive and demanding. Approaching others about unacceptable behaviour is quickly explained as a form of harassment. The public space is characterised by private actions. Residents are largely unwilling to exert effort to enhance the quality of life in the neighbourhoods or cities. Mobility, remove and change have made neighbourhood networks vulnerable. It can be said that citizenship has been outsourced.

In case of conflict, citizens are quick to turn to the civil courts and commercial forms of mediation in the quest for compensation for their damages. Citizens make use of complaint and grievance procedures, and they sometimes seek to make their point in court. They participate in customer panels, feedback groups and other forms of consultation in which the police attempt to adjust their tasks to the needs and experiences of the population. Many branches use instruments of self-regulation (quality certification). Residents' associations sometimes organise themselves into self-management projects and purchase private security services or acquire physical means of security (e.g. locks, fences, street lighting, cameras). Law enforcement and compliance are managed largely through external incentives or disincentives (likelihood of being caught, fines).

In short, the citizen is a customer and the police a service provider. Law-enforcement tasks dominate; police work is performed by a standardised police organisation in which information management and acting on signals from the population play a major role. The police inquire, advise and provide information (e.g. about security measures), provide customised services, assist with security inspections and collaborate with private security providers.

Within this scenario, security policies face many difficulties. The market encourages opportunistic and calculated action. Concern for the public welfare is of secondary importance, and civic duties are fulfilled reluctantly or as a necessary evil. Price-conscious citizens are primarily interested in comparative shopping. Efficiency is the most important standard, and the instrumental interpretation of tasks prevails within the public police as well. The demand for police services is hardly ever considered in light of the general interest.

One problem is that the logic of market regulation is lost on many citizens. Some population groups are not well informed about police products, or they lack the means to act as price-conscious citizens.

Non-measurable police activities are ignored, and neighbourhood policing receives less attention. There is less contact with the public, thereby placing the authority of the police under pressure. In addition, professional autonomy is diluted by a fixation on outputs, performance and managerial control. A rich form of professionalism, in the sense of moral commitment to the public good and representation of the constitutional state, is absent. Performance criteria have caused the emergence of an 'insincere enforcement'; the police have been seduced by appearance management (Bayley 1994).

B. Co-production of order

This scenario has many of the characteristics of community policing and community justice, which draw upon the self-organisational capacity of citizens and businesses. Volunteerism is flourishing and social institutions (e.g. neighbourhood associations, churches, schools) are exerting attraction. Dissatisfaction is not projected onto the state.

Citizens are outspoken and resilient; many have sufficient social competencies, and are willing to invest time and energy into their surroundings. People realise that they are dependent upon each other. Security policies have a social-organisational function; contracting, mediation, collaboration and partnership are central tasks, as opposed to making arrests and issuing penalties. For example, drug use is no longer a legal issue; the police, schools and parents work out solutions on their own.

Citizens are active participants in the design of security within their own surroundings, and they resolve their own problems, as has been the case in many rural communities. Citizens maintain active surveillance (e.g. as neighbourhood managers, in “neighbourhood father” projects and neighbourhood watch organisations). Neighbourhood mediation and the establishment of codes of conduct for neighbourhood centres, entertainment outlets, parks and squares are all components of active citizenship. Citizens are also involved in interactive policy advisement, and they alert the government to problems that should be addressed. Many are also involved in establishing community safety plans.

At the local level, the police are one of the partners in the security networks. The goal is to create a structural approach to quality-of-life issues, together with partners, and to expand the base of support for local security policy. The police are willing to relinquish a portion of their power and to encourage citizen self-reliance. They are strongly oriented towards prevention (e.g. of crime, disorder and nuisance) and they strive to reinforce informal social control. The police serve as an extension of the community, and they function as liaison officers. The relationship between the police and citizens is symmetrical.

The core tasks of the police include the following: advising, consulting, involving citizens and businesspeople, supporting their initiatives, communicating the results of local problem-solving to citizens. Other tasks involve clarifying the authority status and competences of the professionals with whom citizens come into contact, providing sufficient justification for decisions, providing clear guidelines and facilitating transparent decision making for everyone.

This model has a number of troublesome aspects as well. It reveals many of the ‘vices’ of classic corporatism. Dialogue is often sluggish and opaque; some groups have little access to this dialogue, and their interests are insufficiently represented. Only a limited number of citizens participate in the dialogue. Those with less education are often underrepresented. Measures against ‘problematic’ minority groups (e.g. young people) are quick to gain support. The image of the police as ‘a citizen’s best friend’ can also work against the police. They are easily accused of partiality, while there is little insight into their discretionary power.

The police must expend considerable effort to involve residents and businesses in security problems and to maintain partnerships. In some communities, the police are held at a distance. In some cases, peripheral problems (e.g. discrimination and maladapted young people) take precedence over traditional police tasks. Police work is not considered urgent, and there is

little demand for it. Such core tasks as reproducing order, accompanied by violence (or the threat of violence) if necessary, are disappearing.

The police have no hard criteria for measuring outputs; this appears possible only by measuring citizen satisfaction and trust.

C. Interventionist state

This scenario reflects the European continental tradition in which policing is oriented at the exercise of power. The police have a monopoly on crime prevention, and it is not necessary for them to maintain contacts with partners. This is a maximal form of policing (as compared to the minimal policing in English-speaking countries) (Bayley 1994). The long arm of the law is seen as a promising instrument for encouraging social integration. Compulsion has creative potential.

The police fulfil a strongly symbolic function: 'We are the police for everyone'. There is a strong emphasis on the classic tasks of repression, crime fighting and enforcing order. This model has long been considered the ideal for the police; their authority has been accepted as long as they provided protection. The paternalism of 'Father State' has been tolerated, particularly because it ensures solidarity and social security. National pride and harmony are also a part of this climate. In this regard, Loader discusses a deep form of security: security as a public good, a shared sense of belonging, security and trust among relative strangers (Loader 2006).

Whereas the former *Polizeistaat* was characterised by order and authority, the new interventionist state is much more strongly oriented towards prevention. The state operates in an environment of uncertainty, and must work to address the public concerns about values: 'Morality is going astray'. The new state attempts to channel indignation resulting from intimidation in the neighbourhood, senseless violence, sexual offences and insecurity in nightlife, by insisting upon social adaptation. The appeal to the state to guarantee security has thus increased as well. The municipality makes use of administrative law and new ordinances against problematic behaviour (e.g. obligatory assistance with child-rearing, obligatory addiction therapy, anti-aggression courses). As illustrated in Rotterdam, the mayor is the new focal point of security policy. At the same time, this new order is characterised by a belief in the problem-solving capacity of experts. All sorts of experts (e.g. physicians, psychologists and social workers) are prepared to help those involved to find the right path.

Citizens are loyal and reserved; they are more accurately described as subjects than as resilient citizens; they are more likely to be 'yes people' than they are to be 'no people'. They make reports to the police almost automatically. Citizen participation thus has an element of 'obliging'; citizens provide the police with information about incidents and suspicious occurrences (examples include *Burgernet* and *Sms-alert*). Citizens are the 'eyes and ears' of the police, and they are restricted to 'passive surveillance'. Street and neighbourhood coordinators provide information to the police as well. Citizens are explicitly not expected to take matters into their own hands. At the most, they assist the police with surveillance, or they volunteer (e.g. as 'voluntairs') within the police organisation. Citizens may also hold paid jobs with the police.

The police operate on their own forces. 'We ensure security', if necessary, by calling in city marines and intervention teams, as is currently the case in Rotterdam. They maintain a visible

presence, in hotspots as well as in communities, and enforce the ‘minor norm’ (zero tolerance). This scenario involves a strongly normative police force that restores order and peace. Reassurance plays a role as well, although it is reassurance *for* rather than *by* citizens. There is little room for consultation or advisement. A more likely possibility is a new moral authority for the police involving the transfer of values to citizens (an important ritual function) and warning citizens that their behaviour will not be tolerated.

The disadvantages of this model are strongly associated with the culture of control, a sovereign state strategy that resorts to moralisation and discipline. Many new laws of dubious enforceability have been introduced. The expanded role of the police has resulted in network expansion and the practice of ‘defining deviance upwards’. Problematic behaviour has become criminalised. Non-cooperative people are forced to adjust their behaviour. There is also a serious chance of arbitrariness and abuse of police power.

Security is ‘consumed’ (just as in the market-forces scenario), albeit through the emergence of a dependency on the government. The police function in a largely supply-driven manner, thereby receiving relatively few indications of their own faults and shortcomings.

D. Fortification

This scenario is characterised by a fragmented society in which the public police concentrates on imposing law and order in insecure and deprived parts of cities. In particular, major cities have become divided into company estates, compounds and enclaves that are sharply separated from their ‘dangerous’ surroundings. In those compounds security is big business, and it is in the hands of security organisations with private clients. Semi-public areas are closed off and poorly accessible to unauthorised parties. Industrial parks, airports, amusement parks and sports arenas are also closed off. Police policy actually consists of a dualistic system, with private policing that focuses on preventing crime in certain areas and public policing that enforces the law in the remaining areas, often in a zero tolerance style.

As in Scenario A, instrumental forms of control and enforcements are dominant. In Scenario A citizens seek to move safely within an open society knowing that the public police will arrive quickly in case of emergency. In Scenario D, citizens and business assume the worst, and reinforce their own borders. The dominant principle is avoidance: curtailment of interaction. More emphasis is thus placed on the deterrence function of permanent surveillance. A new security regime (e.g. smart cards, surveillance cameras) offers protection against unwanted external influences. Risk management has advanced greatly. ‘Risky’ individuals (e.g. drug addicts, thieves) should be identified early. Actuarial logic – tracing risk groups through statistical profiling – is used to establish risk categories. An ‘aesthetic policing’, which emphasises transparency, hygiene and order, prevails within the compounds (Harcourt 2001).

There is no well-known way of relating to others within the public realm. At the same time, there is a strong call for repression. In marginalised communities, neighbourhood guards (e.g. self-help, vigilantes) are formed to protect against outsiders independently of the police. Neighbourhood guards can also turn against the police.

In these situations the public police is forced to gain grip on the impoverished parts of the city that cannot afford private protection, the problematic neighbourhoods, transition zones, and second rate night districts. The public police are technologically oriented; they ‘know without

being known'. They are distant and businesslike, and there is no reciprocal relationship with citizens. Detection is focused on potential threats (e.g. dropouts) according to actuarial logic. Dominant tasks in this scenario include information exchange and supplementary protection, comparable to the role of the police at professional sporting events. Within many semi-public domains, private security is responsible and calls for assistance when it cannot meet this responsibility. The public police also supervise the supply of private contractors through such means as publishing the results of inspections.

In this scenario, the public police must wrestle with many problems. The security networks within a fragmented society often operate in an episodic and ad hoc manner. For the public police, there is no real script to follow; there is no departmental policy within which to work, and the police generally have little accountability for their actions. It is difficult for the police to gain the trust of the population, and they must continually resort to a show of power (e.g. exclusion and stigmatisation). Repression and coercive measures are largely at the expense of minorities. The state lacks the power to reverse this dichotomy.

The core of police professionalism – respectful and responsive action – tends to become meaningless. Marginalised and disadvantaged residents have developed an adversarial attitude towards the police and other authority figures.

3.3. The role of police officers and citizens in the four scenarios

How could police officers and citizens be expected to act in each of these four scenarios? It is clear that citizens would behave quite differently in a scenario in which the state holds a monopoly on security than they would in a scenario in which they bear primary responsibility. Citizen behaviour, however, is also determined by whether security is ensured through primarily technological or through primarily social-normative means. The four possible combinations can be represented as follows.

A) The citizen as customer: Citizen customers act within a market in which security is largely a matter of technical measures or facilities, choosing the ones that are most appropriate to their individual situations. Although individuals are active, their activities do not take the form of social-moral attitudes.

B) The citizen as partner: In this scenario, citizens are indeed social-moral actors. In addition to being accountable for their own behaviour, they are also prepared to assist the police. Examples include keeping a watch on suspicious citizens or finding other ways of contributing to a higher level of public safety.

C) The citizen as subject: In this scenario, citizens take very little action, and they are often the object of professional intervention. Public safety is an important task of the state, and one that requires the use of social or moral resources. The state imposes all sorts of obligations on citizens, and the balance of power clearly weighs more heavily in favour of professionals.

D) The citizen as hostage: The state and its professionals are particularly active in this scenario as well, and the security services that are provided take on a repressive and strongly technical character. Citizens must simply accept this and hope that their safety is ensured; they can do very little on their own.

These scenarios obviously have implications for the actions of public police officers. Each of the four possible situations assumes some role for police officers. Although citizens play an important role in both the market-regulation and co-production models, their roles are unlikely to extend so far as to render the police unnecessary. We propose the following four types, in the order presented above.

A) The officer as knowledge broker: In this role, officers do not act on their own to any great extent, involving themselves more with gathering information about citizens and companies. Their own actions are also less necessary, as residents and private actors (including companies and private security guards) perform a large share of the work. Officers make information services available to citizens and companies; they communicate by e-mail and telephone and are able to notify the appropriate agencies immediately in problem situations. In this situation, therefore, officers do not use strong moral or normative means.

B) The officer as servant: Private parties are particularly active in this scenario as well, but officers do more than establish social connections. They are active in enforcement, using social or moral norms in the process. They assist citizens as needed and interpret their duties as more than a mere technical chore. They form lasting and personal relationships and do not hesitate when citizens approach them after hours.

C) The officer as paternalist or strict educator: The police also have a strong social-normative engagement in this scenario, but its relationship to citizens is quite different from that in the previously described situations. Officers consider it their role to impose the necessary norms on citizens, or to approach citizens powerfully in this regard. Their actions are educational in nature and are characterized by ‘stern justice’.

D) The officer as enforcer who acts without regard for anything or anyone: Once again, the enforcement of rules is primary, albeit without any moral-normative aspects. Officers simply apply their technical and legal resources and make full use of the possibilities related to their monopoly position in the area of public safety. Citizens have little input, but they are protected by deterrent police actions. Citizens who commit infractions are simply out of luck: in this scenario, enforcement is associated with little regard for the people or situations involved.

The various roles of police officers and citizens are depicted schematically in the following figure.

A	B
Market regulation	Co-production of order
Citizen as customer Police as knowledge broker	Citizen as partner Police as public servant
D	C
Fortification	Interventionist state
Citizen as hostage Police as zero tolerance enforcer	Citizen as subject Police as paternalist

4. Towards police strategies

To date, we have outlined four conceivable scenarios reflecting the possible future relationships between the police and citizens. These scenarios obviously provide a slanted image. In reality, broad developments are taking place in which central aspects of each scenario play a role. These aspects, which include for instance risk management and the formation of partnerships, could be encountered in other scenarios as well. As stated earlier, however, the scenarios are intended to be one-sided. Some aspects have been exaggerated, and others have been omitted in order to increase their heuristic value. This brings the problems into sharper focus, allowing sharper formulation of the policies to be developed.

The question of which policy strategies can be designed departing from the four scenarios, can be classified into three sub-questions.

First, opportunities and risks are associated with each scenario. It is helpful to estimate the costs of a given scenario and the magnitude of social resistance (strong organisation of potential losers). This can lead to a variety of policy reactions. While it is possible to go along with the social climate that prevails within a given scenario, it is just as possible to go against the 'spirit of the times'. For example, it would be possible to work against excessive expectations with regard to the police, even in the face of public demand. Which policy strategies could now be developed in order to counteract the problems within each of the scenarios?

A second question involves the scenario that is best suited to the context of the Netherlands. To address this question, we must distinguish between the national and local levels. On a national level, 'suited' implies that the scenario does justice to the most prominent values that are important in society, that it fits within the political culture or that there are not too many tensions with the operation of the justice system. On a local level, 'suited' acquires a different meaning. Because the goal of each scenario is obviously to increase security, they should relate the difficulties and possibilities existing on location.

A third question involves the direction of future development. Are certain scenarios more likely than others are, and to which social developments are they related? It is obvious that a definitive answer to this question is nearly impossible. In addition to the fact that the future is, by definition, open and therefore unpredictable, the answer is affected by the many uncertainties mentioned above. Furthermore, many of the listed tendencies do not point in a single direction. There are even tendencies that appear to be in diametric opposition to each other, even though they are both relevant. In the discussion above, we have mentioned several examples of such tendencies. If forced to guess, however, which would be the most plausible?

4.1. Opportunities and risks within each scenario

What are the crucial problems and questions within each scenario? Which interests are at stake? The chief problem in each scenario has already been accentuated: consumerism (A), favouritism (B), coercion/meddling (C) and exclusion (D). Can these 'vices' be resolved, and how? Should we go along with or against the 'spirit of the times'?

A. Market regulation

In this scenario, the public task of the police (i.e. embodying symbolic justice and confirming the prevailing norms) is at stake. Input legitimacy – the symbolic function of the police as the guardian of order, law and justice – is being ignored. The police is not really able to fulfil normative expectations and represent the values of the constitutional state. This may have serious consequences: a police system that does not respond to protecting rights would lose its credibility. The police system is not a business; it is a knowledge institution within the democratic constitutional state. It must continually account to the public for its authority, and it cannot and should not be allowed to meet the desires of citizens in all respects.

The police would also lose credibility if they were to deliver their products on demand and operate according to the standards of their customers. This would infringe upon the professionalism of the police. By neglecting input legitimacy, the police could also become incapable of ‘alerting and advising’.

The business mentality could be corrected by assigning high priority to legal protection and the confirmation of public norms. The police could temper the expectations of citizens and criticise their tendency to avoid responsibility (‘The police should do it’). The police could also make citizens aware of such hypocritical attitudes as ‘griping’ about order and protection while accepting fraud and speeding as normal. The police could therefore also act as a teacher (e.g. through information campaigns) while more clearly demonstrating its role as a figure of authority. The police are the ‘boss of the street’ and only to a lesser extent an advisor and consultant to citizens.

Reassurance policing – allowing citizens to see that peace and order have been restored – could also serve as a counterweight. Trust is more likely to be bestowed for responsive action than for efficient working (e.g. reducing crime).

B. Co-production of order

In this scenario, the police play a largely supporting role. If they are not careful, they could be pushed to the sidelines and be forced to lay off a considerable proportion of their personnel. Little attention is paid to classic tasks (e.g. forceful action, crime fighting), whereby the police could lose some of their legitimacy. Many doubt the necessity of co-production and collaboration (e.g. with citizens but also social work or other services). The police have no hard criteria available for measuring outputs. This appears possible only by establishing the level of citizen-satisfaction with the policy that has been carried out.

At the same time, the police could reinforce their impartial and authoritarian role. When norms have been obscured by insufficient social cohesion or conflicts of interest, however, the police should assert their authority.

C. Interventionist state

Within this scenario, the police are a resolute crime fighter and enforcer of law and order. Overload is one of the core problems of this role. Priorities should be set. A second problem is insufficient legitimacy of enforcement and intervention work. The arm of the police and other professionals reaches too far. Thus, the police have become alienated from citizens. These two problems could be resolved through the stimulation of citizenship and the introduction of

community policing. Security policies could be strengthened through collaboration, mediation and arranging contracts.

A supply-driven approach provides the police with little feedback; exchange with other professionals and with citizens is necessary in order to adapt the supply. The police need other parties; they lack knowledge, and they are insufficiently apprised of whether they are doing the right things. Citizens could be stimulated to express their criticism, thereby helping to make the police organisation more responsive and less rigid.

D. Fortification

In this scenario, equality and legal guarantees are liable to be pushed aside. The public police provide no protection for every citizen. Corruption and illicit action are highly likely. A police strategy of 'going with the flow' is out of the question. It is necessary to take strong action against the fragmentation of public life. In fact, the police should completely reinvent their public task. They should protect people who are in danger while offering extra leeway to those whose participation is impeded. This would involve security to 'those who need help', such that they are able to accept responsibility and dare to do so. At the same time, the police should empower. In other words, they should support behaviours that emphasise society in the midst of differences.

Empowerment also involves the reinforcement of prevailing norms, even if only through police presence. The police should actually apply all of the available policy options, from imposing restrictions on the behaviour of self-satisfied citizens to providing assistance.

4.2. Which scenario is most appropriate?

As stated before, this question must be addressed on two levels: local and national. On a national level, it is important for the scenario in question to correspond somewhat to the values that play a prominent role in Dutch society. We can make this concrete by determining the extent to which the two axes from Schema 1 correspond to aspects of our national culture. Do Dutch people prefer a strong state, or do they place more value on citizen input (the vertical dimension)? Do Dutch people view public safety as primarily a technical-legal facility, or do they consider the social-moral aspect to be of great importance (the horizontal dimension)? Posed in this way, the questions can indeed be answered.

Comparative research by Geert Hofstede shows that the Dutch have little tolerance for authoritarian relationships. A strong state that imposes all sorts of measures on the population from above and imposing public safety by force if necessary, would not be credible. In countries like France, citizens see the situation differently, and that has consequences for the operation of the police as well. The French police are organised centrally; they maintain great distance from the population, and they are not afraid of taking strong repressive action. In this regard, the Dutch police are at the other end of the spectrum.

The position of the Netherlands in relation to the second dimension (the horizontal axis) is more difficult to determine. In this regard, Dutch society appears to have two souls. At first glance, the society appears to be little more than the sum of the sixteen million individuals that live without real contact and that like to present themselves as customers. This would imply that we are located on the left side of the horizontal axis. At the same time, however, a

powerful movement in the opposite direction emerges from time to time, leading Dutch people to see themselves as a moral community. This reaction usually manifests itself in times of tension or collective threat. Dutch people thus often seem to be less progressive and liberal as one would expect at first. The rejected referendum concerning the expansion of the EU, the widespread scepticism concerning market forces in the public realm, the strict requirements that are imposed on newcomers, the debate about values and a certain tendency towards ‘national nostalgia’ in reaction to uncertainties arising out of globalisation – all of these things indicate a preference for the social-normative extreme on the continuum presented above.

Combining these two preferences points to the conclusion that the second scenario (co-production of order) in its broadest outline is best suited to the Dutch situation. This is confirmed by the profile that the Dutch police have acquired since the 1970s. This profile rests upon a lasting relationship with the citizenry in combination with a strong normative configuration on the part of the professionals.

This general image does not lead to the conclusion that the second scenario forms the best fit for the Netherlands in all cases. It is necessary to consider local conditions. All studies of region-bound police and urban communities reveal major differences in this area. There are indeed cases in which the police can limit themselves to the role of knowledge broker. These cases involve communities with many highly educated and affluent residents who like to make their own contributions to safer surroundings and who can also afford the facilities necessary to do so. In such settings, the scenario of market regulation could well be feasible. There are also communities in which the residents themselves initiate activities in a less individualistic way. They maintain a lively community life, practice the necessary social control and often have outspoken moral ideas about behaviours that are (or are not) permissible. Under these conditions, the police do best to present themselves as helpers, making the scenario of co-production the best suited.

We obviously know of several communities in which the third scenario would fit well. For example, consider problem neighbourhoods and the public-safety problems that are associated with such settings. Such problems are often so urgent that there is no alternative for strong police action. The police must establish clearly who is in charge in the public spaces, while also working to strengthen the sense of civic values. Police officers in these neighbourhoods have an unmistakable educational function, even though they must often cooperate with other professionals in this regard. This involves a new mixture of care and force that was described in the previous discussion as the state-intervention model. Rotterdam and other cities have experimented with this model.

Finally, we must consider the situation for which the scenario of fortification would be best suited. We think that such a situation is virtually non-existent in the Netherlands. It is true that certain citizens do live in some type of gated communities, but they are nothing in comparison to situations that can be observed in some city-areas in the United States. In our country, there is even a clear resistance to what is known as the ‘American state of affairs’ and the social isolation of heavily guarded affluent citizens is a part of that image. Although such conditions could emerge in the future, we consider ‘fortification’ the least appropriate scenario for the time being.

4.3. Towards which scenario are we evolving?

The final and most difficult question involves what the future will bring in the area of public safety. Which of the four models that have been described will be the most evident in about ten years? The greatest difficulty is obviously the presence of a great many factors and variables that determine how a society views questions regarding danger or safety, as well as the fact that we can never know how these factors will look in 2020. Society can be affected by tremendous risks that come from outside, varying from terrorist attacks to ecological disasters. Other dangers can arise from within, creating situations that call for urgent measures. We do not know what will happen if the current discontent among citizens with regard to politics continues to exist for a long time, and we know even less about the future effects of new technology. The only thing that we can do is attempt to assess the tendencies that have manifested themselves in the past twenty years and create a sketch of the situation that is likely to emerge if they continue for a substantial time. We must also weigh the uncertainties that have been sketched in the discussion above. Although such consideration inevitably has a speculative and subjective aspect, it also invokes a more or less predictable future.

In a nutshell: we think that scenario C will still be the least unlikely. This can be argued on the grounds of multiple developments. One argument involves the tension existing between market forces and moral community. In theory, both approaches can be used in order to reduce risk and combat dangers. Nonetheless, the interest in that type of operations is not always the same. Looking back on the recent past, we can establish that the Dutch policy has frequently involved the deployment of market forces. Such instruments have been quite popular since the 1980s for many reasons, and they were dominant for twenty years. The most recent five years, however, have shown a remarkable turnaround. At present, the use of market forces is being questioned in many circles, and we are observing a renewed appreciation for moral values and a search for community formation. This directly affects the ways in which people define the work of the police and their duties with regard to public safety. This turn of events is likely to continue for more than a few years. We are inclined to think that this episode will also last one or two decades. If such is the case, the Netherlands is more likely to be on the left of Schema 1 than it is to be on the right. Although the development of new technical resources will undoubtedly continue, we can strongly question whether these developments will undermine the necessity of a social-normative approach. The challenge appears to centre on deploying these new resources in such a way as to strengthen the normative content of society.

Not only are recent developments instructive with regard to the horizontal axis of Schema 1, they also tell something about our movement along the vertical axis. We see that the centre of gravity is gradually shifting towards the state and its various professional organs. Although there are good arguments for giving citizens a greater share in the promotion of public safety, practice shows that doing so requires systematic and lasting effort on the part of the government. Moreover, governments are exerting gradually increasing pressure on citizens to behave decently. When churches and other private organisations could still make a moral appeal to the citizenry, it might have still been possible for the state to view the struggle for order and justice from some distance. Now that these organizations have fallen away or lost their power, however, the state cannot avoid strengthening morality itself. When interventions are needed with regard to troubled communities, anti-social families, trouble-making youth or fraudulent corporations, the rule of law must ultimately come into play. Furthermore, the past ten years have taught us that a portion of the population is emphatically calling for such

intervention. In other words, the weight of the state is gradually increasing, while the efforts of citizens for the public good have failed to take shape sufficiently. This change in the balance of power between the government and citizens has indeed called forth considerable criticism and protest. Accusations of paternalism and meddling are not based on thin air. Unfortunately, however, these outcries offer very little in the way of alternatives for government involvement.

Taken together, these tendencies lead us to expect that Scenario C will be the most likely in the coming ten to twenty years. This is not to say that everyone will be happy with this development. Given the idiosyncrasies of our national culture, most citizens are likely to prefer Scenario B. However, a development toward that scenario will be realistic only if there are visible improvements in citizen performance in the area of discipline, self-control, social control, moral values and decent behaviour. As long as this does not occur, governments will have to take over this function (partly), and the police will acquire an important task in this area.

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